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Abstract—The problem of cooperative spectrum leasing to
unlicensed Internet of Things (IoT) devices is studied to account
for potential selfish behavior of these devices. A distributed game
theoretic framework for spectrum leasing is proposed where the
licensed users can willingly lease a portion of their spectrum
access to unlicensed IoT devices, and in return the IoT devices
provide cooperative services, firstly to enhance information se-
crecy of licensed users via adding intentional jamming to protect
them from potential eavesdroppers, and secondly to enhance
the quality of communication through cooperative relaying. The
cooperative behavior of the potentially selfish IoT devices is
monitored using a reputation-based mechanism to enable the
primary users to only interact with the reliable IoT devices.
The simulation results show that using the proposed reputation-
based method enhances the secrecy rate of the primary users by
reducing the possibility of attacks from selfish IoT devices. Hence,
this model can offer a practical solution for spectrum leasing
with mobile IoT devices when assuring the required quality
of communication and information secrecy for the spectrum
owners1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Development of new wireless communication technologies
and skyrocketing demand for new data services, in particular
growing Internet of Things (IoT) with potentially billions of
wireless devices, motivated many dynamic spectrum allocation
technologies to enhance the spectrum utilization efficiency.
While current research efforts focus on common spectrum
sharing mechanisms where the licensed users are unaware of
unlicensed users’ presence (e.g. database control and spec-
trum sensing mechanisms), these methods may not be the
best choice for spectrum sharing with IoT devices. Energy
constraint and limited spectrum mobility at these often tiny
devices restrict their performance in spectrum sensing mech-
anisms. Moreover, having a central controller or enabler to
keep a record of licensed users’ spectrum usage and allowable
interference range as required in database control technologies
(e.g. TV White Spaces) may not be practical in such large-
scale IoT networks.
Another drawback of the majority of common spectrum
sharing models is their overly conservative approach to protect
the incumbent users against malicious and selfish unlicensed
entities. Hence, such approaches that enforce a low level of
transmission power for unlicensed users, or allocate a wide
and static protection zone around the incumbents, are unable
to address the increasing demand for radio spectrum from
IoT networks. Furthermore, in common model paradigm, the
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licensed users do not usually benefit from allowing the unli-
censed users to share their spectrum, but even they can suffer
due to interference from Secondary Users (SUs). That being
said, flexible spectrum right models in which the Primary
Users (PUs) can willingly lease a portion of their spectrum
access to unlicensed users (e.g. IoT devices) in exchange
for remuneration or some sort of compensation (e.g. energy
harvesting or cooperative relaying service) can offer a win-win
solution for both parties [1]–[6].
However, one main concern toward enabling shared access
techniques to the radio spectrum, particularly the federal
bands, is security. In addition to traditional security threats in
wireless networks such as concerns related to privacy of the
users, authentication, and confidentiality of communications
among the users in the presence of eavesdroppers, networks
with dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism are also vul-
nerable to unauthorized access to the spectrum as well as
potential selfish behavior of users taking advantage of the ad
hoc nature of such networks [7]–[9]. Therefore, the cognitive
radio networks are prone to suffer from various exogenous,
malicious, and selfish attacks. Some of these attacks are
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to deny the unlicensed users
from spectrum access, sensing data falsification attacks, and
primary user emulation attacks, only to name a few [10],
[11]. Different security mechanisms have been proposed to
address these attacks, which among these information theoretic
secrecy methods aim to secure the communication of the
nodes from potential eavesdroppers by exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels [12]. This can be achieved
by adding artificial noise, using beamforming techniques, or
employing MIMO techniques [13], [14]. Despite conventional
cryptographic methods, information theoretic secrecy-based
techniques do not rely on encryption keys, and hence do not
involve key distribution and key management complexities.
Cooperative jamming in cognitive radio networks has been
implemented by employing the SUs to create artificial noise
[15], or transmit structured codewords to reduce the eavesdrop-
per’s capability in decoding the PU’s information. The poten-
tially non-cooperative SUs can be encouraged to provide such
a service if they are granted with a chance of spectrum access
for their own transmission, as introduced in [15]. Providing
cooperative jamming for the primary users, in addition to
other previously studied compensation techniques such as co-
operative relaying and energy harvesting, can offer a practical
solution for implementation of property-right cognitive radio
networks without involving money exchange among the parties
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or other regulatory issues [15]. In [14], a Stackelberg game
model is defined to model the interactions between a legitimate
source node and a non-altruistic secondary user in presence
of an eavesdropper. The secondary user can be compensated
with a fraction of the legitimate source node’s access time to
radio spectrum if it provides cooperative jamming to enhance
the secrecy rate of the source node. This model is further
extended to a scenario with multiple potential cooperative
jammers where the competition among them is modeled as
an inner Vickrey auction. The proposed model [14] favors the
primary user by defining the game in such a way that the
time allocation to access the spectrum as well as the ratio of
the power, which the secondary users spend on cooperative
jamming and the one they utilize for their own transmission,
are determined by the primary user. Although the primary user
deserves more benefits as the spectrum owner, in reality there
is no guarantee that the secondary users will follow the power
allocation ratio requested by the primary user after being
granted with spectrum access. The authors in [16] study a
similar model with the objective of enhancing the secrecy rate
of both the primary and secondary nodes, where the secondary
nodes are assumed to be fully trustable.
While cooperative jamming provided by the SUs can po-
tentially enhance the secrecy rate of the licensed users, it
involves the assumption of having unconditionally cooperative
and trustable SUs, as considered in the majority of previously
reported studies [14]–[17]. However, this assumption is far
too optimistic in communication networks, noting the non-
altruistic nature of cognitive secondary users (e.g. IoT de-
vices). This frequent assumption has been revisited in some
work considering different aspects of potential selfish or
malicious behavior by SUs. The authors in [18], [19] discussed
a scenario where the relay nodes can potentially act as
eavesdroppers and study whether cooperation can still improve
the secrecy. In this paper, we consider a scenario where the
secondary users can be selfish but not malicious and propose a
reputation-based mechanism to identify the untrustable users.
It is assumed that the SUs are pre-authenticated and the
problem of dealing with authenticating intruding/malicious
secondary nodes is out of the scope of this work.
In the majority of previously proposed reputation-based
methods to enforce cooperation, the users (e.g. relay nodes)
self-report their reputation [20], [21]. Therefore, such methods
are prone to the security and reliability of communication
channels to report these reputations. Another vulnerability of
such methods is the possibility of reporting false reputations by
selfish/malicious nodes that requires an audit unit to identify
such misbehaving users [22], [23]. Also, authors in [24]
proposed a weighted cooperative spectrum sensing framework
for infrastructure-based networks which requires a base station
to receive reports and updates from secondary users. But, our
model does not need any base station, so it is compatible with
any infrastructureless or ad hoc networks. In [25], a reputation-
based secure method is proposed for distributed networks that
involves a heavy overhead for update messages from neighbor
nodes. However, in our proposed model, the reputation of the
potential relay nodes is directly observed by the source node
(e.g. primary node), hence it can prevent the impact of false
reports. If such a first-hand reputation of a relay node was
not available to a primary user, it can inquire this reputation
from other primary users in the neighborhood (second-hand
reputation) as further explained in Section III.
Fig. 1. An example of spectrum leasing to secondary IoT devices in exchange
for cooperative jamming and cooperative relaying. In this example, ST4 is
the selected trustable secondary IoT.
Let us consider the problem of spectrum leasing to sec-
ondary IoT devices in the presence of a passive eavesdropper,
in which these IoT devices provide cooperative relaying and
cooperative jamming services to enhance the secrecy rate and
quality of service of the primary user in exchange for spectrum
access. Since the IoT devices often have a limited energy, the
natural tendency of such non-altruistic users can often lead
to selfish attacks where they violate their commitments to the
primary users after they are granted the spectrum access. In
this paper, we propose a reputation-based method to monitor
the cooperative behavior of these IoT SUs in terms of the
power they dedicate to requested services from the primary
user including cooperative jamming and cooperative relaying
to prevent potential selfish behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is described. The formulation of the
proposed reputation-based Stackelberg game is defined in
Section III. The simulation results are presented in Section
IV, followed by concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network consists
of a single primary user (PU), and N secondary IoT users
(SUs) who are seeking to obtain spectrum access. There also
exists a passive malicious eavesdropper, ED, who attempts to
decode the PU’s message, as depicted in Fig. 1. The PU’s
transmitter, PT , intends to send a secure message to its
receiver, denoted by PR. The transmitter and receiver of SU
i are denoted by STi, and SRi, respectively. All transmitters
and receivers are assumed to have a single antenna.
It is assumed that channels between the nodes are slow
Rayleigh fading with constant coefficients over one time slot.
These channel coefficients are defined as follows: i) hPSi
refers to channel coefficients between the PU’s transmitter
and ith SU’s transmitter; ii) hSiP , hSi , and hSiE denote
the channel coefficients between ith SU transmitter and the
PU’s receiver, the ith SU receiver, and the eavesdropper,
respectively. We assume that there is no direct link between
PT and PR. A common assumption of availability of Channel
State Information (CSI) at the transmitters using standard
channel state estimation techniques is followed here [14]–[16].
The noise sources at the receivers are complex and circularly
symmetric, i.e. n ∼ CN(0, σ2). A constant power PP is
assumed at the PU, while the maximum available energy for
each time slot at SU i is Emaxi .
Each time slot of PU’s access to the radio spectrum, T , is
divided to three phases, as depicted in Fig. 2. During Phase
I, (1 − α)T , the PU broadcasts its message to the available
secondary users. It is assumed that the eavesdropper is out of
the range of direct communication from the PU’s transmitter.2
If the transmitted signal at PT is denoted by S, the received
signal at SU ith transmitter during the first phase is
XSTi =
√
PPhPSiS + nST (1)
where nST ∼ CN(0, σ2) denotes the noise at STi.
During Phase II, αβT , the selected trustable secondary user
(as defined in Section III) participates in cooperative relaying
and jamming. If secondary user i is selected by the PU,
it forwards the PU’s message to PR with power PiC , and
also adds artificial noise z with power PiJ to confuse the
eavesdropper. A Decode-and-Forward (DF) relaying scheme
is deployed at the secondary users where the received mes-
sage is fully decoded. We assume that a secure information
transmission mechanism is in place where the PU’s receiver
can obtain a priori knowledge of the added artificial noise by
the secondary user [16], [26], [27]. One practical method to
obtain this a priori knowledge of artificial noise is using a
pseudo-random generator with finite states at the relay and
legitimate primary receiver, while the state of the pseudo-
random generator is sent to the PR via a secure control
channel. While this mechanism only involves a small amount
of overhead, it results in enhancing the secrecy of the PU’s
transmission since the artificial noise creates interference at the
eavesdropper but it can be fully removed at the PR. Hence,
the received signal at PR can be written as
XPR =
√
PiChSiP Sˆ + nPR (2)
where Sˆ denotes the re-encoded signal transmitted by STi
after DF, and nPR ∼ CN(0, σ2) is noise at PR. The received
message at the eavesdropper during Phase II is:
XED =
√
PiChSiESˆ +
√
PiJhSiEz + nED (3)
where z ∼ CN(0, 1) is the artificial noise added by STi.
During Phase III, the selected secondary user transmits its
own message to its corresponding destination with power PiS .
2If the transmission in Phase I was subject to eavesdropping, the primary
user can allocate a portion of its power to sending an artificial noise to protect
its transmitted signal from the eavesdropper.
Fig. 2. System model of proposed spectrum leasing scheme between the PU
and the selected trustable secondary user.
If the transmitted signal by STi is denoted Sˆi, the received
signal at SRi, XSiR can be written as
XSiR =
√
PiShSi Sˆi + nSiR
nSiR ∼ CN(0, σ2) is the noise at SRi.
Based on this model, if the codewords at the PU are
Gaussian inputs, the achievable secrecy rate of the primary
user, RPSEC , defined as the communication rate at which no
information is revealed to the eavesdropper can be written as
RPSEC = [RP −RE ]+ (4)
where RP is the accumulated rate at the PU’s receiver and
RE is the accumulated rate at the eavesdropper (information
leakage), and [x]+ denotes max(x, 0). For simplicity of nota-
tion, we remove [.]+ sign from now on. The rate at the PU’s
receiver is defined as RP = min(RPSi , RSiP ) noting the DF
relaying scheme at the selected secondary user i [28], hence
the secrecy rate at PR can be calculated as:
RPSEC = min
(
(1− α)T log2(1 +
PP |hPSi |2
σ2
), (5)
αβT log2(1 +
PiC |hSiP |2
σ2
)
)
− αβT log2(1 +
PiC |hSiE |2
σ2 + PiJ |hSiE |2
))
It is worth mentioning that to achieve nonzero secrecy
rate for the primary user, the conditions of |hPSi |2 >|hSiE |2, |hSiP |2 > |hSiE |2 should be satisfied for the CSIs,
where there is no direct link between the primary users and
eavesdropper [29].
III. PROPOSED REPUTATION-BASED STACKELBERG GAME
MODEL
Here, we define a Stackelberg game model to describe
the interactions between the primary and secondary users
in the proposed spectrum leasing scenario. The objective of
the PU is to enhance its secrecy rate through utilizing the
reliable secondary nodes while the secondary IoT users aim
to obtaining the chance of spectrum leasing from the PU and
maximize their transmission rate considering the power cost
of cooperation with the PU. Such cost refers to the consumed
power for forwarding the PU’s message and adding a jamming
signal to it. Despite the previously reported works, where the
SUs were forced to utilize an equal amount of power for their
own transmission and service for the PU [14]–[16], we account
for the selfish nature of the SU’s behavior to allocate a small
portion of their power (PiJ + PiC ) to the PU’s requested
services, in order to maximize their own transmission rate
by having a larger remained power to themselves, (PiS ). It
is worth mentioning that both services requested by the PU
(jamming and relaying) occur during the second phase (αβT ),
hence the selected SU does not benefit from changing the ratio
of the power spent on relaying or jamming since its overall cost
of service to the PU remains as (PiJ + PiC )αβT . Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that the ratio of power for jamming
and relaying denoted by ρ = PiJPiC
is requested by the PU and
the selected SU has no incentive to change this ratio.
In the proposed Stackelberg game, the PU as the spectrum
owner is defined as the game leader to declare its strategies
first, and the SUs are the game followers. The strategy set
of the PU is to: i) select the most reliable secondary user;
and ii) determine the optimal time allocation among the
three phases, i.e parameters α and β. A reputation value is
assigned to each SU that keeps track of their performance in
terms of power allocation between their own transmission and
requested services by the PU . The reputation value of each
SU is monitored and maintained by the PU, and increases
when the SU allocates enough power for cooperation and
jamming. Let us define Rk(n) = (r1(n), r2(n), ..., rN (n)) as
the reputation vector stored at the kth PU at time n, where
rki (n) ∈ (0, 1] denotes the reputation of SU i observed by kth
PU at time n for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Here, we define first-hand
reputation and second-hand reputation based on the existence
of prior interactions between a primary and secondary pair. If
PU k has a history of direct interaction with candidate SU i,
the first-hand reputation at time n, rki (n) is defined as
rki (n) = min(r
k
i (n− 1) + η3 ln(ni ), 1) (6)
where η3 is the pre-defined factor and ni is a function of
power for individual transmission of user i, the power for
requested services by the PU , and the channel conditions at
time n, i.e. (ni =
PiJ |hSiE |2+PiC |hSiP |2
PiS |hSi |2
). The reason behind
considering the CSIs in this definition is to assign a change
of reputation proportional to actual channel condition that a
secondary user is experiencing. With this definition, the repu-
tation of misbehaving secondary users declines rapidly due to
the characteristic of ln function while it would take a fairly
long time to restore the reputation in case of misbehaving.
This mechanism can potentially prevent the secondary users
from oscillating between good behavior and misbehavior due
to the long period of time required to restore their reputation.
If a user recently moves to a proximity of a primary user or
there does not exist a prior record of interactions between a
primary and secondary pair, then the primary user can inquire
the SU’s reputation from its neighbor. In these cases, the
second-hand reputation is defined as
rki (n) =
Σj∈Pki r
j
i (n)
|Pki |
(7)
where Pki is the set of primary users in proximity of kth PU.
If a secondary user is new in the network and there is no
prior information about its reputation, then the reputation of
this unit will be set to the lower bound of reputation range.
The utility function of secondary user i is defined as:
USi(PiS , PiC , PiJ ) = α(1− β)T log2(1 + SNRi) (8)
− η1α(1− β)TPiS − η2αβT (PiC + PiJ )
+ ln(PiJ |hSiE |2 + PiC |hSiP |2 − PiS |hSi |2 + 1)
where SNRi denotes the signal-to-noise ratio at ith SU
receiver. The last term in (8) is proportional to the change
of reputation. Therefore, decision making at secondary user
i involves a trade-off to increase its own transmission power
PiS to obtain a higher transmission rate; while it needs to
dedicate enough power to cooperation, Pic and jamming, Pij
to maintain a good reputation in order to be chosen for the
next rounds. The condition related to limited energy at SU i
can be written:
αβTPiC + αβTPiJ + α(1− β)TPiS ≤ αTPimax (9)
where Pimax denotes the maximum power available at SU
i. Since these secondary IoT users are self-interested, they
Fig. 3. Stackelberg Game Model.
exhaust their available energy that results in βPiC + βPiJ +
(1−β)PiS = Pimax . Noting this equality and the requested ratio
of power for jamming and cooperation by the PU, ρ = PiJPiC
,
the utility of SU i can be written as a function of one of the
three power strategies of this user, (e.g. PiS ) as
USi(PiS ) = α(1− β)T log2(1 +
PiS |hsi |2
σ2
) (10)
− η1α(1− β)TPiS − η2αβT
Pimax − PiS (1− β)
β(1 + ρ)
− η2αβTρPimax − PiS (1− β)
β(1 + ρ)
+ ln(PiJ |hSiE |2 + PiC |hSiP |2 − PiS |hsi |2 + 1)
where η1 and η2 are predefined normalizing coefficients for
energy to form it similar to transmission rate. The hierar-
chical interactions between the Stakelberg game players are
summarized in Fig 3. The PU’s optimum parameters (α∗, β∗,
k), and the corresponding power choice of the SU (PiS ), are
cooperatively considered as the Stackelberg solution that can
be obtained through a backward induction algorithm. In each
iteration of the game, the selected SU observed the selected
strategy of the PU (i.e. α, β), and responded to this by
selecting its optimum power allocation to maximize its utility.
Lemma 1: The utility of secondary user, (10) is concave
in term of PiS .
Proof : To prove the concavity of secondary utility, the
second derivative of (10) with respect to PiS is driven as:
∂2Us(PiS )
∂2PiS
=
−α(1− β)T
ln(2)
(
|hsi |2
σ2 )
2
(1 +
PiS |hsi |2
σ2 )
2
(11)
+
−A2
(PiC |hSiP |+ PiJ |hSiE | − PiS |hsi |+ 1)2
< 0
where A2 is equal to (−( (1−β)β(1+ρ) )|hSiP | − (ρ (1−β)β(1+ρ) )|hSiE | −
|hsi |)2. As seen in (11), USi is strictly concave in terms of
PiS for given values of α, and β.
Theorem 1: The Stackelberg solution of the proposed game
is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: During the backward induction process to obtain the
Stackelberg solution, the strategy of the PU is selected by
maximizing (5) as α∗, β∗ = argmaxRPSEC(α, β). Then the
selected SU observes this strategy and selects its optimum
power allocation set. According to lemma 1, the utility of
the selected SU is strictly concave in terms of PiS for any
given value of the PU’s strategy set, therefore the response
of the selected SU is unique. It is obvious that the proposed
single-leader single-follower Stackelberg game converges to
the obtained solution as the follower is rational and the PU can
fully predict the optimal strategy of the selected SU. Moreover,
Fig. 4. Primary Secrecy Rate versus distance of eavesdropper and ST
since the strategy of each user is obtained through finding the
best response to the strategy of the other one, the obtained
Stackelberg solution is a Nash equilibrium.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed reputation-based game model
in enhancing the secrecy rate of the primary user through two
scenarios. The channels between nodes i and j are obtained
from hi,j ∼ CN(0, d−2i,j ) where di,j is the distance between
nodes i and j. The duration of one time slot, T , is assumed
to be equal to 1. The values of η1 and η2 are set to 0.004 and
0.0005, respectively. To have a more strict penalization for
selfish behavior of the SUs, we assume that η1 is higher than
η2. The variance of noise (σ2) is equal to 1mw, ρ is 0.7, and
the primary transmitter uses 3mw power for sending its packet
to the secondary user, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Scenario 1: Single Secondary User
In this scenario, there exists only one SU in the neighbor-
hood of the PU. Fig. 4 illustrates the primary secrecy rate for
different distances of eavesdropper with the relay. As shown
in this figure, increasing the distance between the relay and
eavesdropper results in increasing the PU’s secrecy rate. It
also results in decreasing the jamming power of the secondary
transmitter as the communication will be less vulnerable to the
presence of the eavesdropper, as depicted in Fig 5.
Scenario 2: Multiple Selfish and Reliable Secondary Users
In this scenario, we consider 10 mobile SUs, in which
70% of them are selfish in the sense that they may assign
all their energy to their own transmission if granted with
the spectrum, and the rest of the SUs are fully reliable. It
is assumed that the location of SUs changes in every time
slot to evaluate the performance of the proposed method in
a more practical scenario. The SUs are uniformly distributed
in the neighborhood around the PU. The performance of our
proposed reputation-based method is compared with random
relay selection, and best CSI relay selection methods. In all
three methods, Stackelberg solution is found as the solution of
the mechanism. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of
our method related to existing techniques, we considered an
extreme case where the selfish secondary nodes are closer to
the PU compared to the reliable ones. Also, it is assumed that
Fig. 5. Jamming power of secondary versus distance of eavesdropper
selfish SUs show selfish behavior in 20% of time slots, hence
it is less likely for the PU to identify all selfish nodes using
alternative techniques. Fig. 6 demonstrates the probability of
selecting unreliable nodes for different selection methods. As
seen in this figure, the best CSI-selection method, which is
widely used in many relay selection applications, has the worst
performance in this scenario because it chooses the nearest
SUs. For random selection method, the probability of selecting
the unreliable SUs is close to 70% and does not change over
time, as expected. However, our proposed reputation-based
model is capable of filtering the selfish users over the course
of time.
Fig. 7 shows the allocated time to cooperative services,
αβ, determined by the PU versus the distance between the
eavesdropper and selected SU. The PU is encouraged to assign
more time to cooperative services when the cooperative link is
less vulnerable to eavesdropping in order to enhance its quality
of communication through relaying services provided by the
SU.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a practical solution for spectrum
leasing to unlicensed IoT devices, in which the spectrum
incumbents are motivated to lease their spectrum through
receiving cooperative service from the IoT devices as well
Fig. 6. Probability of selecting unreliable nodes over time
Fig. 7. cooperation phase (αβ) versus the distance between eavesdropper and
the selected SU for different values of ρ
as enhancing their secrecy rate via a cooperative jamming
mechanism. The key contribution of this model is to develop a
reputation-based mechanism that enables the spectrum owners
to monitor the behavior of potentially selfish IoT devices
in terms of their willingness and efforts to participate in
cooperative services. In the majority of existing spectrum
sharing solutions, the secondary users are assumed to be fully
reliable, hence the spectrum owners can often suffer from the
selfish attacks performed with self-interested unlicensed users.
However, our proposed spectrum leasing method gives the
spectrum owners the possibility of only interacting with the
reliable IoT devices and prevents the chance of degradation in
quality of service due to selfish attacks, as confirmed by the
simulation results.
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